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On June 3, 2005, the Sixth Circuit issued its final amended
opinion in BridgeportMusic v. Dimension Films,' in which it held that
any amount of unauthorized digital sampling from a sound recording
is per se copyright infringement. 2 The court justified this ruling on
what it termed a "literal reading" of Section 114 of the Copyright Act,
3
which covers the rights a copyright holder has in a sound recording.
While such a bright-line rule may have some superficial appeal, the
court's efforts at harmonizing current music industry practices with
copyright laws written long before such practices were commonplace
has resulted in greater protection for a sound recording copyright than
4
a musical composition copyright, a result not intended by the statute.
Under the Constitution, the "primary objective of copyright is
not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, [by securing for limited times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and

1.
2.
3.
4.

J.D. Candidate, University of California, Los Angeles School of Law, May 2007.
410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 800.
Id. at 805.
See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2000).
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Discoveries]."'5 "To this end, copyright assures authors the right to
their original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon
the ideas and information conveyed by a work."6 Therein lies the
tension at the heart of the digital sampling dilemma: the desire to
incentivize creativity by granting authors some control over their
creations, while at the same time trying not to stifle creativity by
7
limiting others' access to those creations.
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF RECORDED MUSIC

Recorded music involves two separate copyrights: one in the
8
sound recording and the other in the musical composition.
Performing another's copyrighted material involves the copyright in
the musical composition. 9 Sampling, the actual copying of a portion of
an existing recording, potentially involves both the sound recording
and the musical composition copyrights. 10 "Under the Copyright Act
there is a well-established distinction between sound recordings and
musical compositions.""
Sound recordings and their underlying
musical compositions are separate works with their own distinct
copyrights. 2 The rights of a copyright in a sound recording do not
extend to the composition itself, and vice-versa. 3 While a musical
composition's copyright protects the generic sound that would result
from any performance of the work, the sound recording copyright
protects the collection of musical, spoken, or other sounds captured in
the recording. 14 Under the language of the copyright statute, owners
of musical compositions have more rights than owners of sound
recordings, as the rights of public display and performance belong
exclusively to owners of musical compositions. 5

5.

Feist Publ'n, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
6.
Id. at 349-50.
7.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I1), 383 F.3d 390, 398
(6th Cir. 2004) (noting this tension in the context of digital sampling), amended by 410 F.3d
792 (6th Cir. 2005).
8.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7).
9.
Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4 (1979).
10.
Christopher D. Abramson, Digital Sampling and the Recording Musician: A
Proposalfor Legislative Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1670 (1999).
11.
Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 292 (D.N.J. 1993).
12.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2), (7).
13.
T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575, 1577 n.1 (D.N.J. 1987).
14.
Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd, 388
F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114 (2005).
15.
17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4)-(5), 114(a).
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II. ESTABLISHING AND DEFENDING INFRINGEMENT
In order to succeed in an infringement action, copyright holders
must prove three elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; (2)
proof a protected work was copied; and (3) that the copying was
"substantial enough to constitute improper appropriation of [the]
work." 16 As direct evidence of copying is rare, a copyright holder may,
in the absence of a clear admission, prove copying inferentially by
showing both substantial similarity with and access to the protected
work. 17 Access will be inferred when there has been a reasonable
18
opportunity to see, hear, or otherwise know of the protected work.
Proof of appropriation is established by a two-part test containing both
an extrinsic and an intrinsic element. 19 The extrinsic element
"requires that the plaintiff identify concrete elements based on
objective criteria. ' 20 If this element is satisfied, the fact finder applies
the intrinsic element, which subjectively asks "whether the ordinary,
reasonable person would find the total concept and feel of the works to
be substantially similar." 2' Substantial similarity can occur in two
situations. 22 The first, called "comprehensive nonliteral similarity,"
refers to a situation in which the works as a whole are similar, but not
identical. 23 The second, "fragmented literal similarity," refers to
situations in which only a small portion of the works are identical. 24
Digital sampling cases involve the latter.
Even if there was actual copying, if substantial similarity does
not exist the infringement will likely be considered "de minimis,"
meaning that the infringement is too trivial to be actionable. 25
Alternatively, even if substantial similarity is established, an
infringer may argue the affirmative defense of "fair use."26 Courts
consider four non-exclusive factors in evaluating a fair use defense:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;

16.
Jarvis, 827 F. Supp. at 288.
17.
Id. at 289.
18.
See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. (quoting Pasillas v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991)
(internal quotations omitted).
22.
Ringgold v. Black Entm't Tel., Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997).
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id. at 74 (quoting the full legal maxim "de minimis non curat lex," which is
sometimes translated as "the law does not concern itself with trifles").
26.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.

27

The Supreme Court has articulated that courts must explore
and weigh these four factors together in light of copyright's purpose of
promoting the arts and sciences. 28 However, the Court has also
explained that the fourth factor is "undoubtedly the single most
'29
important element of fair use.

III. DIGITAL SAMPLING ON TRIAL
It was only a matter of time before the growing popularity of
digital sampling,30 combined with easy and affordable access to the
technology used to accomplish it, led to a courthouse debate. One of
the earliest courts to address this issue was the Southern District of
New York. In Grand Upright Music v. Warner Brothers Records,3 1 the
defendant admitted to using the background music and three words
from a sound recording, the copyright in which was held by the
plaintiff.32 While the case is widely known for its opening citation to
the Bible's Seventh Commandment, "Thou shalt not steal, '33 the
court's lack of analysis explaining how it arrived at what sounds like a
per se rule against digital sampling offered other courts little
guidance. 34 While the central issue in the case was ownership of the
plaintiffs copyright, the court nevertheless found infringement based
solely on the fact that the defendant released the infringing album
despite the plaintiffs expressed denial of a license to use the work. 35

27.
Id.
28.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
29.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985).
30.
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004) (defining digital
sampling as "the incorporation of short segments of. prior sound recordings into new
recordings").
31.
780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
32.
Id. at 183.
33.
Id.
34.
See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport I1), 410 F.3d 792,
804 n.16 (6th Cir. 2005).
35.
Grand Upright Music v. Warner Brothers Records, 780 F. Supp. 182, 185
(S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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The court's analysis was simply wrong, as this is not how
infringement is proven. 36 The first problem is that the court engaged
in no substantial similarity analysis at all.3 7 Therefore, infringement
of both the sound recording and the musical composition to the Grand
Upright court is established upon (1) proof of actual copying and (2)
the commercial character of the defendant's use. 38 The fact that the
defendant knowingly released an album containing an infringing work
may be relevant to the statutory damages analysis once infringement
has been established, but it certainly did not establish infringement
per se under any known standard at the time. 39 Furthermore, factor
(2), the commercial character of the defendant's use, is not part of the
threshold infringement inquiry at all, but rather is the first prong of
the affirmative defense of fair use; this defense is relevant only after
substantial similarity has been established. 40 Despite an utter lack of
mooring in either statutory or case law, the positive result of Grand
Upright was "a significant increase in licensing requests and changes
in the way some artists and recording companies approached the issue
of digital sampling." 4 1 In this respect, Bridgeport Music can be
understood as the Sixth Circuit's desire to entrench the Grand
Upright decision. The Sixth Circuit, however, sought to avoid the
fatal misstep of Grand Upright by offering support for its
42
commandment: "[g]et a license or do not sample."
A. Bridgeport I: The Decision in the District Court
In 2001, Bridgeport Music, Westbound Records and other
plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging nearly "five hundred causes of
action against approximately eight hundred defendants." 43 The
district court severed the case into 476 separate actions, one of which
was Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films.44 This particular action
involved the hip hop group N.W.A.'s two-second sample of a three-

36.
Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 288 (D.N.J. 1993).
37.
Grand Upright,780 F. Supp. at 185.
38.
Id.
39.
See Jarvis, 827 F. Supp. at 295 (indicating that one of the considerations in
assessing statutory damages is whether a plaintiff willfully or intentionally infringed the
copyright).
40.
See infra text accompanying notes 26-30.
41.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport 11), 410 F.3d 792, 804
n.16 (6th Cir. 2005).
42.
Id. at 801; see id. at 801-805.
43.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (Bridgeport1), 230 F. Supp. 2d 830,
830 n.1 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
44.
Id.
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note, four-second guitar riff from the George Clinton and Funkadelic
song "Get Off Your Ass and Jam" ("'Get Off") in the N.W.A. song "100
Miles and Runnin"' ('100 Miles"'). 45 The N.W.A. song was used in the
film "I Got the Hook Up." 46 The pitch of the sample from "Get Off'
was first lowered; then the three-note sample was looped to create a
fourteen to sixteen beat segment lasting approximately seven to eight
seconds. 47 The looped segment appeared five times throughout "100
Thus, the total length of all copied material was
Miles." 48
approximately forty seconds. 49 The owner of the sound recording of
"Get Off," Westbound Records, sued the producer of "I Got the Hook
Up," No Limit Films LLC ("No Limit"), for infringement.5 0
In moving for summary judgment, No Limit did not contest
that N.W.A. copied from the sound recording of "Get Off. '5 1 Rather,
No Limit argued that there was no infringement because the sampled
portion of "Get Off' consisted of "a commonly used three-note figure,"
52
and therefore was not original and not protected by copyright law.
Additionally, No Limit claimed that the sampled portion of "Get Off'
was "legally insubstantial" and therefore the copying did not
In denying the originality
constitute actionable infringement. 53
argument, the court focused on the "aural effect produced by the way
the notes in the chord are played" and concluded that a reasonable
jury could find that the way the notes are played on "Get Off," rather
than the chord itself, is original and creative, which would entitle the
54
sampled portion to copyright protection.
The court then examined No Limit's argument that the sample
was neither qualitatively nor quantitatively significant to "Get Off. ' 55
In addressing this de minimus argument, the court explained that in
addition to actual copying, "the plaintiff must show ... that the copied
work and the allegedly infringing work are substantially similar," an
element that is "always required" for actionable infringement.5 6 The
substantial similarity test it employed asked whether an "average lay
observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 833, 838.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 841.
Id.

49.

Id.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id..
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 838.
at 839.
at 838.
at 839.
at 840.

2007]

A BRIGHT LINE ATANY COST

The court further
appropriated from the copyrighted work." 57
explained that most courts focus the de minimis analysis on "whether
the defendant appropriated, either quantitatively or qualitatively,
constituent elements of the work that [we]re original," and that this
analysis was more or less the same as the fragmented literal
58
similarity test.
Examining the work quantitatively, the court found that the
total running time of "Get Off" was approximately two and half
minutes, and therefore, at only two seconds, the sample comprised "a
mere fraction of the whole" of the plaintiffs work. 59 While the total
running time of "100 Miles" was approximately four and half minutes
and the copied material lasted as long as forty seconds, the court
articulated that the substantial similarity inquiry focuses on "whether
so much has been taken as would sensibly diminish the value of the
original; and whether the labors of the party entitled to copyright are
60
substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another."
Examining the works from a qualitative perspective, the court
explained that "Get Off' was essentially a celebratory song about
61
dancing, while "100 Miles" was about being chased by the police.
Accordingly, the court found that the two songs exhibited "no
similarities in mood or tone." 62
The court further stated that
plaintiffs' work in "100 Miles" would not be recognizable to a lay
observer (or even to an "aficionado" of Clinton's work) as being
63
appropriated from "Get Off."
The district court held that "the minimal quantitative copying
and lack of qualitative similarity" warranted dismissal of the
plaintiffs claim. 64 The court concluded its analysis by explaining that,
while there was "blatant copying" in this case, the defendant's use was
"creative," and emphasized that a "balance must be struck between
protecting an artist's interests, and depriving other artists of the
building blocks of future works. Since the advent of Western music,
musicians have freely borrowed themes and ideas from other

57.
Id. (quoting Tuff 'N' Rumble Mgmt., Inc. v. Profile Records, Inc., No. 95 Civ.
0246, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4186, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1997)).
58.
Id. at 841 (quoting Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1257 (C.D. Cal.
2002) (citation omitted)); see infra text accompanying note 24.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. at 840 (quoting Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmerbee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85
(6th Cir. 1943)).
61.
Id. at 842.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
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musicians." 65 While this last sentence might seem curious, given the
court's conclusion regarding the dissimilarities in mood and tone, it

should be understood as the court's conception of a society that accepts
the free exchange of ideas. Accordingly, when, as in this case, themes
and ideas are not borrowed but rather used as raw materials to create
a wholly dissimilar, transformative work, punishing that activity
would not serve the purposes of copyright law.
B. Bridgeport II: The Decision in the Sixth Circuit

On appeal, Westbound argued that the district court erred
because a substantial similarity or de minimis inquiry should not be
undertaken at all when the defendant does not dispute that it digitally
sampled a copyrighted sound recording. 66 The Sixth Circuit agreed,
reversed the district court's decision, and announced its "new rule"
that the de minimis/substantial similarity analysis only applies when
the musical composition, not the sound recording, is allegedly
infringed. 67 The court held that digitally sampling from a protected
sound recording without authorization is per se copyright
infringement. 68 The court justified this result mainly on what it called
a "literal reading" of Section 114 of the Copyright Act. 69 The Sixth

Circuit reasoned that because the owner of a sound recording
copyright possesses the exclusive right to create derivative works
which "rearrange[], remix[], or otherwise alter[] in sequence or
quality"7 0 the original recording, "a sound recording owner has the

exclusive right to 'sample' his own recording." 71 The court accepted
the statutory interpretation that unless a new work consists "entirely"
of an independent fixation of other sounds the sound recording
72
copyright is infringed.

65.
Id.
66.
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (BridgeportII), 410 F.3d 792, 798
(6th Cir. 2005).
67.
Id. (acknowledging that had the Sixth Circuit followed the district court's
analytical framework, it would have agreed with the district court's result).
68.
Id. at 798-799.
69.
Id. at 805; see 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) ("The exclusive right of the owner of copyright
in a sound recording under clause (2) of section 106 [the right to prepare derivative works
based on the copyrighted work] is limited to the right to prepare a derivative work in which
the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise
altered in sequence or quality.").
70.
BridgeportII, 410 F.3d at 799 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)).
71.
Id. at 801.
72.
Id. at 804 n.18.
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The court then articulated what it saw as the advantages of its
bright-line approach.73 Echoing Grand Upright, the Sixth Circuit
announced: "To begin with, there is ease of enforcement [with this
interpretation]. Get a license or do not sample. We do not see this as
stifling creativity in any significant way." 74 It explained that an artist
is still free to re-create in a studio the sound of any sample he would
otherwise copy. 75 This is a curious statement given the fact that the
court itself acknowledged that, in such a case, the musical composition
would still have to be licensed. 76 In this regard, it seems as if nothing
has changed-the artist can either license the musical composition, or
take his chances that his re-creation will not be held to infringe under
a substantial similarity analysis, just as before.
The court then expressed confidence that the market will
dictate license prices, keeping the practice affordable, because no one
will pay a license fee greater than what it would cost to duplicate the
sample in a new recording. 77 This statement reveals the Sixth
Circuit's limited understanding of the value of sampling: sampling is
not used just to save production costs. Rather, a sample may contain
78
a unique sound, which would otherwise be impossible to recreate.
Finally, the court focused on intentionality or willfulness,
saying that "sampling is never accidental . . . When you sample a
79
sound recording you know you are taking another's work product."
The court immediately followed this sentence with a footnote citing
the "Thou shalt not steal" language from Grand Upright.80 The Sixth
Circuit characterized the taking from a sound recording involved in
digital sampling as physical rather than intellectual.8 '
This
distinction seems to be one of the court's justifications for treating
sound recordings and musical compositions differently, but it does not
really make sense. If digital sampling is considered a physical taking
from the sound recording, then why is it not also one from the musical
composition (which the sound recording contains)? Both copyrights
require that the work be fixed in a tangible medium; a musical score

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 801.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 800 n.8.
Id. at 801.
Robert M. Szymanski, Audio Pastiche:Digital Sampling, Intermediate Copying,

Fair Use, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 271, 272 (1996) (citing Steven Dupler, Digital Sampling: Is
it Theft? Technology Raises Copyright Question, BILLBOARD, Aug. 2, 1986, at 74).

79.
80.
81.

BridgeportII, 410 F.3d at 801.
Id. at 801 n.12 (citation omitted).
Id. at 802.

538

VANDERBILTJ. OF ENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 9:3:529

on paper is certainly no less tangible than a compact disc.8 2 At best,
the court's distinction between taking from a sound recording and
taking from the musical composition is unconvincing. At worst, it
seems to run contrary to the Supreme Court's thoughts on this
analogy:
It is less clear, however, that the taking that occurs when an infringer arrogates
the use of another's protected work comfortably fits the terms associated with
physical removal employed by Section 2314 [of the National Stolen Property Act].
The infringer invades a statutorily defined province guaranteed to the copyright
holder alone. But he does not assume physical control over the copyright; nor does
he wholly deprive its owner of its use.
While one may colloquially like
infringement with some general notion of wrongful appropriation, infringement
plainly implicates a more complex
set of property interests than does run-of-the83
mill theft, conversion, or fraud.

Had the Sixth Circuit recognized that it should have taken its
guidance from the Congressional Report on Section 114 of the
Copyright Act, rather than from the Bible, the result would have been
different. According to the Report:
Subsection (b) of [S]ection 114 makes clear that statutory protection for sound
recordings extends only to the particular sounds of which the recording consists,
and would not prevent a separate recording of another performance in which those
sounds are imitated.
Thus, infringement takes place whenever all or any
substantial portion of the actual sounds that go to make up a copyrighted sound
recording are reproduced ....84

As is clear from this Report, Congress intended that the
substantiality requirement apply to the infringement analysis of
sound recordings; thus, the Sixth Circuit's contrary conclusion is
unjustifiable. Looking to the Report would have helped the court
resolve what it should have seen as its own contradiction: "We have
taken a 'literal reading' approach. The legislative history is of little
help because digital sampling wasn't being done in 1971."85 While it is
generally true that sampling was not being done in 1971, it does not
follow that a literal approach would correctly resolve the issue. The

82.
Lucille M. Ponte, The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Digital Sampling
Infringement Cases Are Exposing Weaknesses in Traditional Copyright Law and the Need
for Statutory Reform, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 544 (2006).
83.
Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 217-18 (1985) (finding that the
National Stolen Property Act provision that imposed criminal penalties for interstate
transportation of stolen property did not include the interstate transportation of
unauthorized copies of unreleased sound recordings because they were not "stolen,
converted or taken by fraud" except in the sense that they were manufactured and
distributed without consent).
84.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 106 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,

5721.
85.

BridgeportII, 410 F.3d at 805.
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legislative history is of great help and it should have been used by the
Sixth Circuit in BridgeportII.
IV. CONCLUSION

Literally, of course, the Sixth Circuit's per se rule, as expressed
in Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, does not so much weaken the
protection for musical compositions as it strengthens the protection for
sound recordings. The decision that sound recordings deserve more
protection, however, can be equated with a normative judgment that
musical compositions have less value than sound recordings.
Accordingly, it is easily imagined that while the standards for
determining infringement of a musical composition do not literally
change, courts will conduct the inquiry in a far less meaningful way
and it will become more difficult to prove infringement of the musical
composition. This is no answer for unlicensed digital sampling.
Instead of changing the rule, the Sixth Circuit should have affirmed
the decision of the district court and dismissed the plaintiffs
86
infringement claim.

86.

Id. at 803.

